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This article examines cooperation in 
the electric energy sector in the Baltic re-
gion. The author explores the existing un-
dersea HVDC power exchange projects. It 
is emphasised that cooperation in the 
electric energy sector is concentrated 
largely in the EU member states despite 
earlier plans to establish the Baltic energy 
ring, which would also include Russia and 
Belarus. The author stresses that one of 
the most acute problems for the EU today 
is overcoming isolation of the energy sys-
tems of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Lat-
via, and Estonia) from that of the major 
part of the EU. This task has become es-
pecially relevant after the closing of the 
Ignalina NPP (Lithuania), which used to 
be the primary energy source for the three 
Baltic States. The article examines key 
projects of the construction of new inter-
national power transmission lines in the 
framework of the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) and the 
prospects of the Visaginas NPP (Lithua-
nia) in solving energy problems of the 
Baltic States. The author analyses Rus-
sia’s role in the electric energy market 
and focuses on a possible increase of the 
country’s energy market share following 
the construction of the Baltic NPP and the 
export of generated electric energy to Po-
land, Lithuania, Germany, and Sweden. 
The author concludes that the prospects of 
Russia’s energy export to the Baltic Sea 
region will be determined not only by 
technological, economic and market fac-
tors, but rather by the general state of re-
lations between Russia and the EU. 
Moreover, a lot depends on Lithuania’s 
decision on the construction of the Vis-
aginas NPP, as well as the way the EU 
and the Baltic States solve the problem of 
energy supply in case the NPP project is 
terminated. 
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Energy cooperation has been developing in the Baltic Sea region 
since 1960, although at that time, it was limited to the Nordic countries. 
The energy association Nordel, which brought together Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, and East Denmark, was established in 1963. Undersea high-
voltage direct current cables were laid between the countries of the re-
gion (table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 
Undersea high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cables in the Baltic region 
 
Name Commissioned Countries Total length, km Transmission capacity, MW 
Konti-Skan 1 1965  
(decommission 
in 2006) 
Sweden — 
Denmark 
173 (87 of  
the undersea section) 250 
Skagerrak 1 
and 2 1976—77 
Norway — 
Denmark 
240 (127 of  
the undersea section) 2 × 250 
Konti-Skan 2 1988 Sweden — Denmark 
149 (88 of  
the undersea section) 300 
Fenno-Skan 1 1989 Sweden — Finland 233 (200) 500 
Skagerrak 3 1993 Norway — Denmark 
240 (127 of  
the undersea section) 440 
Baltic Cable 1994 Sweden — Germany 
262 (250 of  
the undersea section) 600 
Kontek 1995 Denmark — Germany 
171 (52 of  
the undersea section) 600 
SwePol 2000 Sweden — Poland 
254 (239 of  
the undersea section) 600 
Estlink 2006 Estonia — Finland 
2 × 105 (2 × 74 of 
the undersea section) 350 
Fenno-Skan 2 2011 Sweden — Finland 
270 (200of  
the undersea section) 800 
 
Compiled according to [1; 2]. 
 
In the early 1990s, the first propositions regarding the creation of the so 
called Baltic Electricity Ring were voiced. In May 1998, the Baltic Ring 
Electricity Cooperation Committee (BALTREL) was established to promote 
the idea of a common electricity market in the Baltic Sea region. It brought 
together representatives of 11 countries: Belarus, Germany, Denmark, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Estonia. 
Moreover, 17 largest power suppliers of the aforementioned countries take 
part in the work of the committee. 
It was planned to integrate the energy systems of the Baltics (Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Estonia), Belarus, and Russia into the power market of Po-
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land and the Nordic countries in the framework of BALTREL. The Baltic 
States were expected to become somewhat of a transit hub for electric 
power exchange between east (Russia and Belarus) and north-west Europe. 
The possibility of constructing new generating facilities (NPPs) was also 
entertained at that time. However, the EU plans shifted in another direc-
tion. They posited integration of the Baltics into the EU energy system and 
reduction in their dependence on Russian energy resources rather than co-
operation with Russia and Belarus. This means that energy integration in 
the Baltic Sea region is interpreted, first of all, as integration within the EU 
[for more detail see 3]. 
Further prospects of BLATREL are unclear. There is still no credible in-
formation on the termination of the work of the committee, but its official 
website (www. baltrel. com) is up for sale. 
It should be emphasised that by the time the countries acceded to the EU, 
the electric energy networks of the Baltics had not yet been connected to the 
networks of other EU member states. They exchanged electric energy only 
among themselves and also received it from Russia and Belarus in the 
framework of the BRELL Loop agreement concluded on February 7, 2001. 
The first step towards the integration of the Baltics into the EU energy mar-
kets was made only in December 2006, when the Eastlink undersea (subma-
rine) transmission line between Estonia and Finland was put into operation 
(table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
Power connections among the Baltics and between the Baltics  
and the neighbouring countries 
 
Countries Number of lines (330 kV) 
Transmission capacity  
(one direction), MW 
Estonia — Russia 3 1400 
Estonia — Latvia 2 1400 
Estonia — Finland 1 350 
Latvia — Russia 1 400 
Latvia — Lithuania 4 1300 
Belarus — Lithuania 5 1400 
Russia (Kaliningrad  
region) — Lithuania 3 700 
 
Compiled according to [4; 5]. 
 
The only net power exporter among the Baltics is Estonia whereas the 
most difficult situation is observed in Lithuania. This country, which was a 
net power exporter in 2009, turned into a net importer after the closure of the 
Ignalina NPP (table 3). 
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Table 3 
 
Power export and import in the Baltics in 2011 billion kWh 
 
Country Power export Power import 
The share of net power import  
(export — import) within total  
consumption, 2011,% 
Estonia 5252 1690 0 
Latvia 27641 40091 17.0 
Lithuania 1970 8710 59.0 
 
1 Including transit. 
 
The isolation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the EU energy net-
works is one of the key issues in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
presented in June 2009 and adopted in October the same year [10]. The Bal-
tic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) was adopted in order to 
solve this problem; the corresponding memorandum of understanding was 
signed by eight EU member states situated in the Baltic Sea region1 on June 
17, 2009 [11]. 
Compiled according to [6—9]. 
 
The key projects for the creation of new international transmission 
lines to be implemented in the framework of BEMIP are the following 
ones [12]: 
 conversion of the existing 220 kV double circuit line into a 400 kV 
line between the towns of Krajnik (Poland) and Vierraden (Germany) 
(2015); 
 3rd interconnection (400 kV) between Poland and Germany (Bac-
zyna/Plewiska — Eisenhüttenstadt) (after 2015); 
 construction of the Elk — Alytus interconnection line (a 400kV dou-
ble circuit with the construction of 2x500 MW BtoB converter stations) 
(2015); 
 3rd interconnection between Estonia and Latvia (2020); 
 2nd HVDC interconnection with a submarine cable of 650 MW capac-
ity between Estonia and Finland (Estlink2, 2014); 
 HVDC submarine cable of 700MW capacity between Sweden and 
Lithuania (NordBalt, 2015); 
 HVDC submarine link between Norway and Denmark (Skagerrak IV, 
2014); 
 South-West link between Norway and Sweden (2019). 
For the Baltic States (especially, Lithuania), it is particularly important 
to secure external power supply, since the second power unit of the Ignalina 
NPP was closed down on December 31, 2009. The first power unit was 
                                                     
1 Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Sweden. 
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taken out of operation on December 31, 20042 as part of the country’s acces-
sion agreement with the EU3. 
An attempt to prolong the operation of the Ignalina NPP at least until 
2012 through the adoption of a corresponding resolution by the European 
Parliament, which was proposed by the Lithuanian ex-president, a member 
of the European Parliament, Rolandas Paksas, turned out to be futile. The 
European Commission and the European Council reacted to the draft resolu-
tion with a comment that ‘the time to make any exceptions had passed’ [14]. 
The closure of the Ignalina NPP, which accounted for almost 70 % of the 
national electricity consumption, put Lithuania into a difficult situation. More-
over, the NPP-generated electric energy was also supplied to Latvia and Esto-
nia. Thus, as early as 2006, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a commu-
nique calling for the construction of a new Visaginas NPP on the site of the 
closed plant. Later, Poland joined the project. In 2011, the Japanese company 
Hitachi Ltd and the Japanese-US joint venture Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, 
Ltd. (Hitachi-GE) were selected as strategic investors [15]. At first, it was 
planned to construct two reactors with the total capacity of 3400 MW, but Hi-
tachi project suggests the construction of only one advanced boiling water re-
actor (ABWR) of a capacity of 1350 MW [16]. However, a number of serious 
problems arose, which questioned the implementation of the project. 
Firstly, the initially announced period of the NPP construction (2015) 
turned out to be completely unfeasible (not to mention the consequences of 
the 2008 economic crisis). The years 2020—2022 are considered to be a 
more realistic completion deadline [17]. 
Secondly, there is a lack of clarity about the financing estimated at 4.6—
5.2 billion euros [18]. Lithuania is not capable of implementing such large-
scale projects on its own, and the number of participants is reducing. So, in 
December 2011, Poland put freeze on its participation in the project; the 
country is planning to construct its first NPP by 2025 [19; 20]. 
Thirdly, at the referendum, which was held on October 14, 2012, 62.7 % 
of voters opposed the idea of the construction of the Visaginas NPP [21]. Al-
though the referendum was non-binding, the Lithuanian authorities cannot ig-
nore the opinion of their citizens. In December 2012, the Lithuanian Seimas 
adopted a resolution, according to which the government had to “develop and 
present to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania an economically viable and 
consumer friendly electric energy supply strategy” in view of the referendum 
                                                     
2 The Ignalina NPP (Visaginas, Lithuania) contained two RBMK-1500 water-cooled 
graphite-moderated channel-type power reactors (the Chernobyl type), each of a ca-
pacity of 1500 MW. Unit 1 came online on December 31, 1983, Unit 2 — on Au-
gust 31, 1987. The construction of Unit 3 started in 1983, but was suspended in 1987 
due to the protests of environmental organisations and the deterioration of economic 
situation in the USSR and was completely stopped in 1989. The construction of Unit 
for has never started. The NPP was designed to operate till 2028—2032. 
3 The influential British weekly newsmagazine The Eсonomist stresses that, as to the 
EU’s requirement to close the Ignalina NPP, “no engineering or safety case for this 
was ever made: the requirement was a political one, sprouting from a neurotic strand 
of greenery in Western Europe” [13]. 
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results and to “draft the corresponding legal acts or introduce changes thereto 
and present them to the Seimas of the Lithuanian Republic until May 15, 
2013” [22]. The government of Lithuania intends to examine the proposals of 
the Visaginas project working group in April 2013 [23]. 
So, the EU countries are rapidly developing energy cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea region. What role does and can Russia play in this cooperation? 
Russia also participates in energy cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. In 
2012, it exported 4.78 billion kWh to Lithuania (the country accounts for 
26.0 % of the Russian export, ranking first in these terms) and 3.79 billion 
kWh to Finland (20.6 %, ranking second) [24]. The export capacity, which 
reached its peak (11.3 billion kWh) in 2003, has been decreasing since 
2009 with a steep decline in 2012 (by 60.6 %) [24; 25]. The main reason be-
hind it is that Russian electricity is too expensive. For instance, in the first half 
of 2012, an average market price for Russian electricity reached 40 euros per 
MWh, whereas an average prices in the energy market of the Nordic countries 
and the Baltics (Nord Pool) was only 33 euros per MWh (as a result of hydro-
power plants generating cheap electricity). Taking into account the existing 
trends in the Russian and Scandinavian power markets, experts of the RIA 
Rating agency came to a conclusion that in the near future, Russia would not 
export electricity to Finland but import it from the country [26; 27]. 
Russian electricity export to Lithuania increased dramatically in connec-
tion with the closure of the second power unit of the Ignalina NPP (in 2010, 
the increase was tenfold in comparison to 2009). However, it is decreasing 
now: in 2012, it reduced by 13.8 % [24]. Just as in the case of Finland, the 
situation was influenced by the pricing in the Nord Pool electric energy de-
rivative exchange, which Lithuania joined in 2010, as well as by the meas-
ures aimed at the liberalisation of electricity market pursued in the country 
since 2010. However, Russia still accounts for 56.2 % of the Lithuanian elec-
tric energy market and 45 % of its total consumption (2012) [28; 29]. 
Another factor contributing to the deteriorating position of Russian elec-
tricity in the Lithuanian market and the market of the Baltics in general is the 
agreement between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania concluded on March 15, 
2013 and coming into force on June 3 the same year. According to this 
agreement, Russian electricity suppliers can sell electricity to the Baltics 
only with the mediation of the Nord Pool Spot exchange and only via the 
‘pricing’ region of the Lithuanian-Belarusian border. According to Taavi 
Veskimägi, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Estonian system op-
erator “Elering", if there were no such an agreement, there would be fewer 
opportunities for energy trade between the Baltics, which would facilitate 
Russian electricity export to the local markets [30]. 
In this situation Russian energy export plans are connected, first of all, 
with the Baltic NPP, which is being erected 13 km south-east of Neman (Ka-
liningrad region). The decree of the Government of the Russian Federation 
on its construction was signed on September 25, 2009. The foundation of the 
NPP was laid on February 25, 2010. 
Two pressurised water reactors of the VVER-1200 type of a capacity of 
1194 MW each will be installed at the plant. The first power unit is sched-
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uled to be put into operation in 2016, the second — in 2018 [31]. It is the 
first Russian NPP, 51 % of which will be publicly owned and 49 % will be-
long to private investors (including foreign ones). At the moment, the Rosa-
tom state corporation and OAO Inter RAO UES are in negotiation with sev-
eral potential international strategic investors on their participation in the 
project [32]. 
At first, the Baltic NPP was oriented not only towards satisfying energy 
demand of the Kaliningrad region, but also towards export of electric energy 
to the Baltic States, Poland, Sweden, and Germany [31, с. 3]. OAO RAO In-
tern UES — the future operator of electricity export from the Baltic NPP — 
considers several options for its export. 
Firstly, it is electricity export to Poland through new transmission lines 
between Mamonovo and Elblag. The transmission capacity can reach 
600 MW (according to other data — 5090—1000 MW), the export capacity 
can achieve up to 4.8 billion kWh; the estimated completion time is 2016—
2017 [33; 34]. 
In May 2010, Russia invited Poland to take part in the construction of 
the Baltic NPP and, later, jointly sell electricity to Europe [35]. At that time, 
no response was given to the invitation. But in November 2012, the Polish 
Minister of Transport, Sławomir Nowak, announced that “Poland may con-
sider the possibility of integrating its energy system with the Baltic NPP in 
the Kaliningrad region” [36]. 
Secondly, it is electricity export to Lithuania. In March 2011, Inter RAO 
UES signed an agreement with Inter RAO Lietuva on the supply of electric-
ity generated at the Baltic NPP to Lithuania at a rate of 1000 MW per year 
with a possibility of increasing this amount from 2019 [37]. To achieve this 
goal, it is planned to improve the existing network infrastructure between the 
countries. The expected supply capacity is 2.4 billion kWh [34]. The Nord-
Balt undersea (submarine) cable could also transmit electric energy from 
Lithuania to Sweden. The joint operation of the Baltic NPP and the Lithua-
nian Kruonis Pumped Storage Plant (which could buy the cheap NPP elec-
tricity during night time, and sell it at a higher price during daytime) also 
seems quite promising [38]. 
However, the Lithuanian authorities oppose the idea of the Baltic NPP, 
being the only Baltic state that did not agree to hold bilateral consultations 
on its construction. In March 2013, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas But-
kevičius said: “I have never participated in any Kaliningrad NPP projects 
and have no intention to participate in such projects in the future…” [39]. 
The main reason behind Lithuania’s negative attitude is that the Baltic 
NPP means direct competition for the Visaginas NPP; and the former is very 
likely to be put into operation much earlier than the latter. At the same time, 
in view of the power deficit in the Baltic Sea region forecasted for 2020, 
Rosatom does not feel any competition between the two projects and is 
ready to discuss Lithuania’s participation in the construction of the Baltic 
NPP, as well as consider export of cheap electricity to this country [40]. 
Thirdly, it is the cable from Mamonovo to Bentwisch in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern laid under the Baltic Sea [33]. It would allow Germany to par-
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tially compensate for electricity deficit, which will become particularly no-
ticeable after the closure of all NPPs scheduled for 2022. The project’s char-
acteristics are as follows: a transmission capacity of 800—1000 MW, a sup-
ply capacity of up to 8 billion kWh, the estimated completion time is 2019—
2020 [34]. In January 2013, the Munich Environmental Institute announced 
that the federal government planned to transmit electricity from the Baltic 
NPP in Kaliningrad via the Baltic undersea route to Germany [33]. However, 
the federal government emphasised that such phrasing was not quite correct 
and the final decision was made by energy companies rather than the federal 
government and the energy import and export was a usual practice [41]. 
The technological aspect of these plans suggests the integration of the 
Kaliningrad region into the European Network of Transmission System Op-
erators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). This intention of the Russian Federation 
has already been announced by the European Commission. Russia also 
wants to include the construction of at least one interconnection to Poland 
and Lithuania in the BEMIP and receive EU financial support for the con-
struction purposes [42]. 
Alongside the Baltic NPP, there are other projects aimed to expand Rus-
sian electricity export to the Baltic Sea region countries. So, there is a plan to 
lay a submarine direct current cable under the Gulf of Finland from the Len-
ingrad NPP-2, which is currently under construction, with an overland sec-
tion in the Vyborg district of the Leningrad region to ensure power export to 
Finland. 
The Baltic Sea region has a large market for Russian electricity, first of all, 
electricity generated by the Baltic NPP. However, this circumstance is not suf-
ficient to forecast a growth in Russian electricity export to the markets of the 
Baltic Sea region states. One should take three factors into account. 
Firstly, Russian electricity should be competitive price-wise. It is ex-
pected that in 2015 an average electricity price in the Kaliningrad regional 
wholesale market will reach 4.3 euro cents per kWh, whereas, in the market 
of the Baltics it will amount to 5.5 euro cents. For 2017, the forecast is as 
follows: an average electricity price in Germany will amount to 7.8 euro 
cents per kWh, in Poland to 7.5 euro cents, in Lithuania to 5.8 euro cents 
[32]. In view of these forecasts, the market situation will be quite favourable 
for the Russian energy sector. 
Secondly, the export of Russian electricity (first of all, from the Baltic 
NPP) requires the construction of new transmission lines and the enhance-
ment of the existing infrastructure. This task is technologically feasible but 
will require international financing (perhaps, also from the EU funds). 
Thirdly, which is the most difficult task, Russian export plans must be 
harmonised with the EU electricity plans. The third EU energy package, 
which came into force on September 3, 2009, is aimed at the diversification 
of energy sources, thus being not so much an economic, but rather a geopo-
litical act. At the same time, the EU assumes that it should avoid relations 
based solely on energy supply and establish contacts covering different areas 
that are of interest both for the EU and its partners [44, с. 3]. Considering 
electricity the key component of future Russia — EU energy relations, the 
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EU insists that such cooperation should not be a “one-way street”. EU com-
panies should have an opportunity to export electricity into the CIS energy 
system. Different companies (including European ones) should have an op-
portunity to export electricity from Russia to the EU [44, с. 5]. 
Thus, the prospects of Russian electricity export to the EU (including the 
EU member states of the Baltic region) largely depend on the general level 
of Russia — EU relations, rather than on solely economic factors. Today 
these relations, unfortunately, demonstrate a high level of mutual distrust, 
which threatens a full-scale implementation of Russia’s electricity export 
projects. A lot will also depend on whether the decision to resume the Visgi-
nas NPP project is made or not, and how the European Union and the Baltics 
solve the problem of energy deficiency in case the NPP is not built. 
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